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Democratic Elitism and Western Political Thought 
[2009] 
John Higley  
Abstract: »Die Theorie der demokratischen Elitenherrschaft und das westliche 
Politikverständnis«. Many political thinkers have viewed democratic elitism as 
closing a democratic road they believe is or should be open-ended. Their view 
of democratic possibilities reflects the auspicious circumstances of Western 
societies during the past several centuries and especially since World War II. 
However, it involves a conflation of liberal and democratic values. I examine 
why and how this has occurred, and I argue that liberal and democratic values 
must be more clearly separated in today’s dangerous world. In step with 
Schumpeter, democracy must be regarded as a method or instrumental value 
that in some but by no means all circumstances promotes the ultimate liberal 
value of actively individualistic free people. 
Keywords: democratic and liberal values, democratization, elites, elitism. 
 
All influential schools of Western political thought since World War II have 
been more or less Utopian. Assuming that political possibilities are essentially 
open-ended, they have been reluctant to rule out any desirable political goal as 
impossible. A case in point is the strong resistance to Schumpeter’s conception 
of democracy as simply a method of representative government and his impli-
cation that democracy can never be more than this. During the past half-century 
Schumpeter’s thesis has stuck in the craws of the many who believe that a 
much more open, participatory, and elite-less democracy is possible (Sartori 
1987: 156-63). 
The Utopian mode of recent Western political thought can be traced, in part, 
to the superpower status and influence of the United States since World War II 
and to American history’s singularly fortunate, but intellectually misleading, 
contours. For at least a century prior to World War II, American interests and 
values were unthreatened by foreign powers. This enabled the United States to 
cultivate its own affairs and refrain from a sustained engagement with the lar-
ger world. In that favored setting and echoing their settler ancestors’ aspirations 
to create a “new world,” Americans came to regard politics as an unrestricted 
means for achieving their ideals, most especially a broad democratic equality. 
As Tocqueville highlighted, democracy has been the American touchstone, and 
Americans have believed that the road to it is open-ended. 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Higley, John. 2009. Democratic Elitism and Western Political Thought. Com-
parative Sociology 8 (3): 440-458. 
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But the “exceptional” history and recent superpower influence of the United 
States do not alone explain the Utopian mode of recent Western political 
thought. One must also take into account the West’s success in perfecting the 
organizational and technological aspects of a civilization that proved vastly 
more productive than any other. 
Once Turkish forces were defeated at Vienna in 1683, the West’s clear mili-
tary superiority over the rest of the world allowed Westerners to presume that 
they would never be faced with cultural degradation, enslavement, or extermi-
nation at the hands of non-Western peoples. Subsequently, after about 1700, 
the running together of clever artisanship, scientific reasoning, and readily 
available land and other natural resources fostered an agreeable notion, namely 
that increases in economic productivity would eventually meet Western needs 
on a substantially equal basis. Most deep social conflicts would then dissolve. 
A principled optimism about political and social possibilities flowed from 
these circumstances. Expectations about the long-term equalizing effects of 
material progress supported the idea that radically different conceptions of 
social justice would eventually be joined in a synthesis acceptable to all. The 
sense of being safe from conquests by non-Western peoples fostered a belief 
that, in the meantime, domestic conflicts in the pursuit of social justice could 
be explored fully, exploited, and fought out without risking a loss of Western 
civilization. Since the Enlightenment and French Revolution, Westerners have 
prevailingly regarded political possibilities as open-ended (Gray 2007). 
This was very different from how politics were viewed during the period 
that antedated the West’s economic and military triumphs. As portrayed by the 
two principal political thinkers of that earlier time, Machiavelli and Hobbes, 
politics are always a dangerous and difficult means for limiting – through de-
ceit, bribery, force, and other stratagems – the potentially chaotic pursuit of 
self-interests in a world devoid of universally shared values. During the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries the West’s increasing optimism about political 
possibilities gradually undercut this essentially harsh and hopeless position. 
The somewhat greater optimism of Locke was followed by the unbridled utopi-
anism of Rousseau and the early socialists and, finally, by the whole panoply of 
progressive liberal, socialist, and democratic thought. 
After World War II the “historic West” – the countries of Western Europe 
plus those of British settlement in North America and the antipodes – formed a 
political bloc largely under American leadership. During the next four decades 
this Western bloc was challenged only by the radical Soviet and Chinese re-
gimes, whose economic ineffectiveness was, however, increasingly apparent. 
By the early 1990s China was embracing capitalism, the Soviet Union had 
ceased to exist, and the republics that once comprised it, as well as the East 
European states earlier controlled by it, had abandoned their rival doctrinal 
allegiance. They sought, in effect, to join the historic West. These watershed 
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changes made it seem that Francis Fukuyama’s forecast in 1992 of an end to 
major international divisions might be correct. 
Early in the twenty-first century, however, there are many indications that 
the circumstances underpinning Western political optimism were fortuitous and 
transient. Although the assumption about open-ended political possibilities 
lingers, the circumstances that made it seem plausible have basically ended. A 
major reality today is that various non-Western states and sects, led by fer-
vently anti-Western elites, possess or will soon possess weapons of mass de-
struction. They will then be capable of devastating Western populations, either 
by direct attack or as a side effect of wars between non-Western states. 
In addition, in their domestic affairs, Western countries confront a serious 
weakening of their occupational orders which will, in a deep economic down-
turn like that which began in 2008, exacerbate distributional conflicts greatly. 
They also confront ominous environmental problems and resource shortages 
that threaten the material progress by which such distributional conflicts might 
be contained. 
As the wheel of fate turns, Western countries may continue to enjoy impor-
tant advantages over the rest of the world for several more generations. But 
there is no solid ground for assuming this. Despite much domestic dissension, 
they may be able to defend themselves against non-Western threats to their 
security, but there is also no self-evident basis for thinking this will be so. It 
may happen that increases in Western economic productivity will continue to 
be sufficiently large to buy off serious domestic discontents and sustain a mod-
est degree of democratic politics through relatively painless redistributions out 
of an economic surplus. There is, however, no reason to take this for granted 
either. 
If the way people think about politics mainly reflects their circumstances, 
these basic uncertainties in the situations of Western countries will in time give 
rise to a conception of political possibilities less optimistic than that which has 
flourished during recent centuries and especially since World War II. Yet the 
problems confronting the West are pressing, and the need to adopt a more 
realistic conception of political possibilities is urgent. Juxtaposing democratic 
elitism with recent Western political thought is one step in this direction. 
Liberal Practices and Democracy 
A hundred years ago, personal safety and respectful treatment in most of life’s 
contingencies were assured to members of upper- and middle-class families in 
Western Europe, the countries settled by English-speaking peoples, and the 
larger cities of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Even in African, Asian, and 
Middle Eastern colonial territories ruled by Europeans this was generally true 
for most upper- and middle-class persons without European ancestors, even as 
the privileges of European rulers were embarrassing and humiliating to such 
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“native” families. Between the well behaved, well dressed, and well spoken in 
all these locales, Western liberal conceptions of personal dignity and impartial 
justice were generally professed and broadly observed. 
Around 1900, of course, such treatment did not extend in any large measure 
to members of lower-class families, ethnic or racial minorities, and women 
who acted outside traditional female roles. Especially in countries not directly 
influenced by British political practices, and especially when they asserted 
rights that dominant classes and strata did not think they had, persons in lower 
statuses were not reliably respected. There is no reason to suppose, however, 
that they were less respected or less safe from abuses than such persons had 
been throughout all earlier history. On the contrary, the widespread profession 
of liberal values among those who were well off resulted in the relatively re-
spectful treatment of the less well off in many legal and occupational situa-
tions. 
On the whole, much larger proportions of populations were accorded respect 
by authorities and institutions than ever before in complex societies. This 
meant, in turn, that larger proportions of non-elites than ever before lived lives 
of substantial self-respect. 
In 1900, governments in Western Europe and the countries settled by Eng-
lish-speaking people derived much of their legitimacy from relatively contested 
and participatory elections of representative parliaments and assemblies. To be 
sure, monarchies in Denmark, Italy, the Low Countries, and Sweden claimed 
significant degrees of independent power, and monarchies in Austria-Hungary, 
Germany, Portugal, and Spain clearly wielded such power. Although suffrage 
was not yet universal, it was advancing toward an enfranchisement of all adult 
citizens. The liberal idea of political choices by at least moderately large elec-
torates in real party competitions was the prevailing standard of political au-
thority. In most Western countries there was no expectation that military coups 
were likely to veto choices made by voters. 
Although this liberal political standard did not extend much beyond Western 
Europe and the English-speaking countries, political activists in other parts of 
the globe tended to accept representative government as their preferred political 
model. In part, of course, this reflected Western colonial power. But whatever 
the cause, liberal political principles were dominant intellectually, and liberal 
practices were beginning to spread widely at the twentieth century’s start. 
The period around 1900 could well be seen, in retrospect, as the high water 
mark in liberalism’s advance. Serious interruptions of liberal practices occurred 
subsequently in many West European countries. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain all ex-
perienced the suppression of liberal practices for substantial periods before, 
during, or after World War II. For long periods during the twentieth century, 
moreover, the Soviet Union and its satellite countries professed communist 
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principles that in practice disregarded the personal rights involved in liberal-
ism, and they eschewed meaningful electoral contests and choices. 
Today, unlike 1900, no Western liberal country exerts much political influ-
ence and power outside the historic West except, insofar as raw power goes, 
the United States. Developments during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century indicate that US power, not to mention US influence, is attenuating. 
Outside the West, except for Japan, Israel, and a few scattered ex-British colo-
nies such as India and Ghana, adherence to liberal principles and practices is 
precarious at best. 
It is certainly no longer the case that members of upper- and middle-class 
families are assured of safety and respectful treatment in the cities of Latin 
America, Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. In the face of 
criminal and political kidnapping on a scale unknown since the Middle Ages, 
the safety, personal liberty, and self-respect of educated, wealthy, and politi-
cally prominent persons and families are now frequently at risk. As they were 
historically before the appearance of liberal and semi-liberal states, politics in 
much of the world are again a dangerous but unavoidable activity. It tends to 
degrade, humiliate, and not infrequently destroy all but the most fortunate of 
those who engage in it. 
When they travel outside the West today, and even when they are at home, 
Westerners are no longer exempt from terrorist actions and the taking of hos-
tages. Especially when outside the West, well-off Westerners cannot count on 
personal safety and respectful treatment. Enmeshed in elaborate security ar-
rangements, they face the real, if statistically still remote, possibility of being 
killed, maimed, or held hostage in the interest of some often obscure political 
sect’s public relations, money-making efforts, or vendetta. The machine-
gunning of a score of Westerners in Mumbai’s most expensive hotels during 
December 2008 is but one illustration. 
As reflected by the relatively illiberal surveillance, profiling, and other secu-
rity measures Western governments are instituting, this new vulnerability of 
Westerners tends to weaken liberal attitudes and practices. Historic liberal 
protections of individual rights such as habeas corpus are loosened, while a 
“Dark Side,” as a recent US vice-president termed it, involving the harsh inter-
rogation, torture, and even assassination of suspected subversives is increasing-
ly seen by Western governments as a necessary evil. 
The basic political reason why liberal practices have failed to spread much 
beyond the comparatively few countries that enjoyed them a hundred years ago 
has been the failure of consensually united elites to form in most countries of 
the world. As pointed out in this issue’s introductory article, an elite that is 
consensually united must emerge before any stable pattern of government 
conducive to substantial political freedom and meaningful political choice 
becomes possible. 
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Around 1900 such elites existed in no more than ten Western countries. Al-
though they exist in perhaps about thirty countries today, most of these elites 
are located in Europe and the English-speaking countries. Recent Western 
political thought has generally failed to recognize this elite basis of democracy. 
Instead, it has naively urged democratic suffrage, free and fair elections, re-
spect for personal liberties, and democratic constitutions on all countries of the 
world, most of which have deeply disunited elites that are engaged in dog-eat-
dog political struggles. Much too blithely, in other words, Western thought has 
assumed that simply by adopting such measures countries will move from 
unstable and illiberal regimes to stable and liberal democracies. In particular, 
assiduous “democracy promotion” efforts have tended to persuade policymak-
ers in the United States and other Western countries that instituting competitive 
elections where they do not now occur is a relatively sure route to democracy 
(Carothers 2002; 2004). 
This failure to recognize the elite basis of any stable and liberal democratic 
political system – a failure that has much to do with how democratic elitism has 
been construed – is a manifestation of the Utopian assumption that political 
possibilities are open-ended. The failure also reflects a conflation of liberal and 
democratic values that need to be kept separate and distinct. Although democ-
racy obviously belongs among the values of any liberal political system, it is 
not, contrary to most recent Western political thought, a reliable instrument for 
promoting liberal practices. 
Politics and Elites 
The conflation of liberal and democratic values is rooted in the reluctance of 
Western political thought to entertain distasteful assumptions about the basis, 
nature and function of politics. One of these distasteful assumptions is that 
politics arise out of rationally irreconcilable conflicts of interest among people 
(Gray 2007). Such conflicts are irreconcilable in the sense that the parties to 
them cannot be shown or persuaded that they are mistaken about their interests. 
Not all conflicts have this character, of course, but many do, and it is these that 
are the principal bases of politics. 
Where conflicts of interest are not rationally reconcilable, politics are the al-
ternative to civil warfare. As history readily shows, politics are hardly a reliable 
alternative, yet they are frequently and widely accepted. This is because the 
many people in any society who lack substantial self-confidence, ambition, and 
assertiveness are usually prepared to tolerate politics in order to reduce the 
amount of violence and disorder that would otherwise occur. They are prepared 
to put up with political actions that are unsatisfactory to them in order to 
achieve a semblance of peace. 
Behind any smoothly functioning political system, in other words, are expe-
diential and tacit conclusions reached by individuals and groups. They con-
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clude that trying to claim all they think they deserve is unprofitable, and that 
conforming to the political organization and distribution of privilege which 
happens to exist offers a better return than they might obtain by openly chal-
lenging the established order. 
Because many of the conflicts that give rise to politics are not rationally rec-
oncilable, political actions seldom fully “solve” social problems in any objec-
tive moral sense. “Social justice” is rarely attained through politics (or through 
any other activity) because in assuming that differences of interest are ulti-
mately mistaken, social justice is a largely empty concept. As Bertrand de 
Jouvenal once observed (1963), political actions result only in “settlements.” 
They contain, discourage, or repress the expression of interests that are not, and 
for the most part could not be, fully satisfied. 
Although political settlements sometimes involve fairly even-handed com-
promises between entrenched and opposed groups, they necessarily sacrifice at 
least some interests that happen not to be well represented at the points and 
places where settlements are reached. This is because elites who are in posi-
tions to shape settlements normally expect to gain something for themselves 
and their friends from the settlements they orchestrate. In most political settle-
ments, some interests are sacrificed merely by the efforts of elites to ensure that 
they, at least, are not disadvantaged. 
Because there are no strictly objective moral solutions to many conflicts of 
interest, and because the elites who make their weight felt when shaping politi-
cal settlements regularly produce more advantages for themselves and their 
allies, elites are commonly judged to be callous, deceitful and immoral. From 
perspectives that would be appropriate when judging many non-political activi-
ties, they are. But as a moral judgment about most or all elites, this common 
view is erroneous, and precisely because politics are a necessary activity that 
never allows fully open and trusting behavior. Political actions that are naively 
open and trusting are normally ineffective. On the other hand, actions that do 
not seek to coerce some persons in ways that are advantageous to others are by 
definition not political. 
Given this nature of politics per se, appropriate moral judgments of elites 
are complex, controversial, and subtle. They are concerned with effectiveness, 
with humaneness, and with culturally shaped notions of fairness. Basically, 
they are concerned with the moral obligation of elites to avoid practices that 
unnecessarily reduce the satisfactions of some persons or unnecessarily de-
grade some persons’ attitudes and behavior. Inevitably, these moral standards 
are culture-bound to a degree. 
Thus, Western liberals have customarily approved of elite practices that cre-
ate or preserve a certain type of self-reliant citizen. Western socialists, on the 
other hand, have regularly called for practices that would foster a more altruis-
tic kind of citizen. Liberals and socialists have tended to disagree, in other 
words, about what constitute unnecessarily harsh and degrading elite actions. 
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The function of politics is to make possible the existence of all larger territo-
rial organizations of people. These range from city-states to modern national 
states to world empires to such weakly organized supranational entities as the 
European Union or the United Nations. But when politics successfully perform 
this function by suppressing overt conflict and producing a reliability of expec-
tations in social life, they tend to conceal their own nature from the persons 
who benefit most from them. Secure and influential, such persons lose sight of 
the basis, nature, and function of politics, and they come to mistake their own 
situations and sensibilities for those of people in general. They find it more or 
less impossible to believe that the political institutions and processes that so 
effectively protect and nurture them are regarded as more or less iniquitous by 
less fortunate people in their own and other societies. 
In this way, successful politics undermine themselves. The most favored 
strata come to contain larger and larger numbers of sentimental and unrealistic 
persons who are unwilling to recognize that their fortunate circumstances ema-
nate in large measure from how elites in their societies have practiced politics. 
These are individuals who like to talk about such things as social justice, poli-
tics without coercion, conflict resolution, participatory democracy and other 
constructs that can only be mainly imaginary. They seek to impose respect for 
such constructs on the elites who need their support. But if elites start to be-
lieve and profess such naïveté seriously, their own effectiveness is crippled. In 
the eyes of less advantaged people at home and abroad, such professions are 
patently insincere, and the elites who voice them are contemptible. 
Only a ruthless tradition of intellectual honesty or a protected private tradi-
tion of objectivity among elites and their immediate supporters can resist this 
tendency of successful politics to be self-undermining. The politics of Western 
liberal countries in about 1900 were perhaps the most successful politics ever 
practiced. Yet, the intellectual life of none of these countries was able to pre-
vent the naïve moral claims that this success inspired from coming to pervade 
the thought and utterances of elites and many otherwise sophisticated citizens. 
Liberal and Democratic Values 
As developed originally by fairly well off bourgeois strata during the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in English-speaking countries and 
northwestern Europe, liberalism emphasized freedom from arbitrary political 
and legal restraints and from political interferences in legitimately private ac-
tivities. Combining beliefs in religious tolerance, freedom of speech for those 
who discussed issues responsibly, and the social utility and inherent fairness of 
freedom for economic entrepreneurs, liberalism did not originally have any 
clear egalitarian thrust. During the nineteenth century the countries in which 
this doctrine was widely accepted achieved political and economic domination 
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over much of the world. Consequently, large parts of their populations experi-
enced great increases in prosperity, leisure, and self-confidence. 
With this, many adherents of liberalism in these countries found that politi-
cal order and social peace were compatible with, and even facilitated by, wider 
and wider extensions of the suffrage. They discovered, in other words, that 
steady increases in national power and prosperity and the multiplication of 
attractive and reasonably influential job opportunities permitted the formal 
democratization of their governments without opening the way to participation 
by any great number of illiberal and deeply discontented persons. 
Thus the English-speaking countries, the Low Countries, and the Scan-
dinavian countries, in particular, enjoyed obvious success in democratizing 
their governments and in extending liberal practices. Most other West Euro-
pean countries moved in the same direction, although more severe conflicts 
among their elites made success less complete. 
In this way, the attainment of stable liberal democracies gradually came to 
be seen as a plausible, even a natural progression. Liberals became increasingly 
committed to egalitarian values in terms of individual rights, including the right 
of suffrage. During the twentieth century this process led to the assumption that 
all of the principal features of modern liberal democracies are equal compo-
nents of ultimate liberal values. These features include constitutional govern-
ment, benign political, administrative and judicial practices, and democracy. 
Looking at each in turn, constitutional government is distinguished from 
powerful monarchies and from the military and other dictatorships that occur 
sporadically in unstable political systems. Benign political, administrative and 
judicial practices strongly respect personal dignity by requiring governments to 
do three things: follow established laws; put themselves at a substantial disad-
vantage in proving persons to be wrongdoers; and refrain from governing at all 
in certain more or less understood matters, such as religion and other forms of 
belief. Finally, democracy, in the sense at least of universal suffrage exercised 
in real electoral contests, is used to determine leading government personnel. 
With this the liberal became a staunch democrat, and the general pattern of 
government in the liberal societies of the West came to be labeled “liberal 
democratic.” However, while this evolution of liberal values into those of lib-
eral democracy was natural enough in the historical economic and political 
contexts of Western countries, in most other countries the twin commitments to 
liberal and democratic values are frequently, perhaps even always, in conflict. 
This is the case because opening effective political participation to all organ-
ized factions in free and fair electoral contests leads inevitably to political 
claims that are unacceptable to many entrenched interests. Such interests are 
commonly numerous enough and well enough placed to carry out coups or 
electoral frauds that sweep away the threats to their ways of life and privileges 
that come from the operation of democratic suffrage. Where entrenched inter-
ests do not manage to do this, revolutionary efforts to overthrow and suppress 
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them produce dire situations. Newly ascendant “revolutionary” elites find it 
necessary to firm up their rule by curtailing liberties drastically. 
In either respect, attempts to achieve liberal democracy merely by instituting 
democratic suffrage and holding elections are almost certain to be unsuccess-
ful. This was amply illustrated by the repeated military coups that terminated 
newly established democratic regimes in Latin America during the 150 years 
following independence from Spanish and Portuguese rule. The general pattern 
of political struggles has been the same in Africa, the Middle East, and most of 
South and Southeast Asia since the end of colonial rule during the decades 
following World War II. 
Linking the egalitarian goal of democracy with liberal goals such as per-
sonal freedom and orderly government has thus involved considerable confu-
sion. It has diverted attention from the elite structures and practices that are 
everywhere a precondition for liberal political practices. In doing this it has 
been harmful to the liberal cause. A more sophisticated understanding would 
see democracy as an instrumental value that under certain elite conditions may 
promote or help realize ultimate liberal values. It is clear that constitutional 
government and at least some version of governmental practice respectful of 
personal dignity are empirically necessary to a liberal regime. But democracy 
in the sense of an extended or universal suffrage is not strictly necessary for 
such a regime. In many ordinary political circumstances it may be inimical to 
it. 
To suppose, then, that a liberal should ultimately prefer democratic gov-
ernment for its own sake is, in fact, a somewhat naive and provincial position. 
It is a position that is speciously plausible to well-off persons who happen to 
live under stable liberal democratic regimes. Their favored circumstances en-
able them to derive personal satisfactions from democratic participation in their 
own government. But it has little plausibility for those who live under illiberal 
regimes or even for less well-off and less self-confident persons in liberal de-
mocracies. 
In general, such persons have no interest in diligent part-time excursions 
into the kind of limited and negotiated politics that offer satisfactions to edu-
cated and relatively privileged citizens. Likewise, in contemplating liberal 
safeguards against violations of personal dignity, less well-off and less self-
confident persons often conclude that these safeguards do little to protect their 
own dignity, which they may feel they have little of anyway. They see these 
safeguards instead preventing effective control of interests that they fear or for 
which they have no serious sympathy. 
In order for liberal doctrine to obtain the allegiance of larger circles than the 
limited number of well-off amateur politicians who like democratic politics for 
the fun it affords them, it is necessary to highlight an ultimate liberal value that 
can be more widely shared. At the same time, this value must be distinguished 
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carefully from instrumental values that may or may not contribute empirically 
to its realization. 
A Social Milieu of “Free People” 
A social milieu of “free people” constitutes the ultimate liberal value. This is a 
milieu in which people deal with each other as equals and in which no one 
claims for him or herself, nor expects to accord to others, systematically greater 
deference or higher privilege. The historical contexts that the expression “free 
people” calls to mind are those that liberals envisage as ideal: the Switzerland 
of William Tell; the Holland of William the Silent; the America of George 
Washington. However, to evoke these contexts is to make it clear that liberals 
value equality only insofar as it is linked to an active and individualistic free-
dom. Liberals care nothing for, and even abhor, the kind of equality that might 
prevail in a community of unassertive persons wholly submissive to custom or 
prevailing opinion. 
The ultimate liberal goal is thus a social milieu in which persons are free 
and equal in active roles. Institutionalized politics and government practices 
that prevent violations of personal dignity contribute instrumentally toward 
achieving this milieu. Unstable politics involving coups and court intrigues, as 
well as government practices that readily degrade people, contribute instrumen-
tally toward preventing or destroying it. As for democracy, or universal suf-
frage, its effectiveness as an instrumental device – or in Schumpeter’s term a 
“method” – for achieving the desired liberal milieu varies with circumstances. 
Characterizing a social milieu of free people as the ultimate liberal value 
implies that liberal attitudes normally require a substantial degree of good 
fortune, self-confidence, and optimism about the future. This is because the 
opportunity to interact with other persons freely and equally is of little value to 
those who do not possess the kinds of occupational and social roles and result-
ing temperaments that facilitate such interaction. Without changes in their 
situations, persons whose roles are seriously degrading, punishing, frightful or 
merely boring cannot be influenced toward, or converted to, liberal attitudes. 
Liberal attitudes can never be contagious, therefore, except among people 
already disposed by a certain amount of good fortune to accept them. 
Yet in any complex and bureaucratized society there is always a shortage of 
the kinds of roles that enable people to interact freely, vigorously, and equally 
with each other. This means that pursuit of the liberal goal may sometimes 
mean “giving to him that hath” while “taking from him that hath not even that 
which he hath.” Less abstrusely, and as an example, any commitment to “social 
justice” that involves as a matter of overriding principle concessions to, or 
privileges for, persons and groups in recompense for their past misfortunes is 
incompatible with a sophisticated allegiance to the liberal goal. 
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When granted on a principled and wide basis, such special concessions and 
privileges threaten to undermine the advantaged positions of those who are 
already liberal. In doing so they help to destroy liberal attitudes where they 
exist without providing any certainty that those being helped will themselves 
adopt such attitudes. No sophisticated liberal can favor such schemes on a 
principled basis. 
Elitism 
Distinguishing between the ultimate liberal goal and instrumental liberal values 
places democracy and other egalitarian measures on a different footing from 
those presumed in most recent Western political thought. It re-emphasizes 
Schumpeter’s conception of democracy as simply a political method that de-
pends for its workings on a number of propitious and underlying circum-
stances. If liberals prefer ultimately to associate actively with free persons on a 
basis of equality, then obviously an entire society of “free persons” that is 
governed democratically and is otherwise egalitarian is the liberal ideal. Liber-
als would greatly prefer this to an oligarchic society in which only a small 
number of privileged people interact on a free and equal basis. 
The problem is that the historical contingencies that produced societies at 
once liberal and egalitarian have been extremely rare. Such societies mostly 
have been tiny collectivities located in agrarian and isolated parts of Western 
countries that were advantaged over the rest of the world by early technological 
progress. Any liberal reasonably familiar with history would not believe that 
this ideal is attainable in most circumstances. The most that a realistic liberal 
normally can hope to attain or preserve is a society that is considerably more 
stratified, but which nevertheless has an upper layer of actively free and equal 
persons. Even this more modest ideal is hardly a common historical situation. 
These considerations point toward elitism. Although the liberal’s ideal is in-
dividualistic participation in a society of equal persons, is such a liberal hon-
estly an egalitarian? An egalitarian is presumably a person committed to the 
equalization of people as an intrinsic good. When this egalitarian preference is 
held unconditionally, it is likely to prove incompatible with the liberal’s prefer-
ence for a society of free persons within which one can interact as an active 
equal. It is simply a matter of historical fact that liberals have sometimes en-
joyed limited approximations of their ideal that would most probably have been 
upset or destroyed by thoroughly egalitarian measures. 
In eighteenth-century England, for instance, a considerable number of well-
off persons enjoyed an approximation of a liberal society in their own interac-
tions. But most of the population was poor, uneducated, disfranchised, and 
subject to abusive treatment by authorities when speaking or acting in ways 
that threatened the well-off. It can hardly be supposed that in that time and 
place the liberal practices that existed would have survived if some force had 
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decreed formal equality for all and then actually implemented this decree by 
equivalents of today’s affirmative action measures and confidence-building 
exercises in community action organizations for the deprived. Likewise, there 
can be little doubt that liberal practices in Western countries today would be 
destroyed if someone established a genuine world government with a full range 
of taxation and police powers and promoting arrangements designed to ensure 
that non-Western countries exercise proportionate shares of influence in the 
world government’s policy-making. 
The implication is that a person of liberal persuasion is prudently willing to 
accept his or her goal in the form of half a loaf if the alternative appears to be 
no bread at all. In other words, the liberal cannot honestly claim to be a com-
mitted egalitarian in the way that some persons are or believe themselves to be. 
The liberal is willing to live in a society where liberal practice extends only to 
that part of the population to which his or her associates belong, if further equa-
lization can only be attained by upsetting this liberal social milieu. 
Likewise, the liberal is willing to live in a liberal democracy that enjoys 
considerable advantages in technology and access to world resources over other 
countries only under certain conditions. One is that international equalization is 
not attainable without drastically curtailing living standards in the advantaged 
country so that its liberal practices would probably be destroyed. Another is 
that there is little prospect, because of the population ratios involved, that inter-
national equalization would create liberal practices in countries whose living 
standards would only be minutely increased thereby. 
The liberal is necessarily elitist, however much this may clash with what he 
or she would prefer as an ideal if ideals could be made real. The liberal has had, 
or expects to have, enough good fortune to want and value the equal interaction 
of free and actively individualistic persons. He or she is more self-confident, 
more self-reliant, and less fearful of powerful persons and interests than the 
average person historically or today. The liberal is not, however, committed to 
inequality. He or she is not among those who prefer a society of unequal and 
mostly un-free persons in principle. 
From the liberal’s standpoint, in short, the more socially or geographically 
extended that a milieu of free and equal people is, the better. If the liberal were 
a magician, he or she would make all persons and all nations able to live to-
gether in active and self-assertive equality. But there are no magicians in social 
and political matters. That is, there is no simple, straightforward way to create 
or extend a society of free and equal persons by political or legal means. 
It is obvious that, as socialists have argued, one cannot make unequal per-
sons equal merely by declaring them equally qualified to vote and participate in 
formal politics, as in a democracy It is also obvious that one cannot make un-
equal persons equal merely by enforcing a variety of rules, principles, and 
standards designed to prevent people from taking advantage of their inequality. 
State socialism tried to do this and failed. The liberal does not seek social ad-
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vantages as an ultimate goal but, instead, accepts advantages when they afford 
free and equal interaction with other persons and when there are no practical 
possibilities for widening the circle of liberal persons. 
When contemplating political possibilities, the liberal is elitist as regards the 
desirability and feasibility of democratic practices. But the failure to distin-
guish the ultimate liberal goal from instrumental democratic considerations has 
caused liberals to misunderstand the real relation of democracy to liberal aims. 
By treating democratic government as an indistinguishable part of a cluster of 
goals, liberals have committed the error of thinking that formal equality in 
political statuses, democracy, is a reliable means for promoting liberal prac-
tices. Considered on its own merits, this proposition – that universal suffrage, 
frequent voting, and other democratic measures reliably, that is, regardless of 
circumstances, promote the interaction of free and actively equal persons – 
should be patently incredible to persons with much political experience or 
knowledge. 
It is more nearly the other way around. Especially among elites, liberal prac-
tices such as avoiding the use of political means to pursue drastic social 
changes are essential to the year-in, year-out acceptance by different factions of 
a Schumpeterian competition for votes that determines who shall hold office 
and who shall define policies. This “live and let live” disposition among elites, 
which means a tacit agreement not to exacerbate potentially explosive conflicts 
and to respect each other’s vital interests, is the sine qua non for any practical 
and durable degree of liberal democratic politics – for democratic elitism. 
By contrast, in societies whose elites and other dominant elements are not 
liberal, those actually in political offices at any given moment fall into one of 
two categories. Most commonly, they represent advantaged strata that do not 
feel themselves secure against future contingencies. They necessarily use po-
litical power, if they can, to further entrench themselves and those they repre-
sent by reducing the freedom of less fortunate strata to upset the regime. Cer-
tainly notions about political freedom do not restrain them from doing this. 
they tolerate democratic practices only when it is convenient to do so, and 
ordinarily this is not for very long. 
The other, less common category of political office-holders in a society 
where liberal practices are not firmly established consists of those who have 
been victorious in a recent revolutionary upheaval. Normally, these persons 
hold egalitarian convictions. But they are well aware, as modern liberals are 
not, that a newly triumphant elite must act in the way just described. Conse-
quently, while members of this elite may regard “government by the people” as 
consistent with their convictions, they have no intention of letting the opportu-
nity to reform society in an egalitarian direction slip through their hands. Cer-
tainly they do not take the chance of setting up an electoral competition that 
might be won by persons not sharing their convictions. Instead, they feel ob-
liged to keep the electoral process effectively controlled in order to produce 
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results they alone approve of so long as they are able to do so. In short, they 
ignore the democratic practices that are of interest to liberals. 
Conclusions 
Has the liberal’s conflation of ultimate and instrumental values lasted too long 
to be reparable? Possibly so. Since at least World War II almost everyone who 
might be considered a liberal has characterized the ultimate liberal goal in 
democratic terms. The unanimity and fervor with which persons regarding 
themselves as liberals have urged extensive democratizations of their own 
societies and of illiberal non-Western ones indicate a near total confusion of 
cause and effect in their understanding of political possibilities. This confusion 
has greatly weakened the self-recognition of liberals to a remarkable point. It is 
uncertain whether liberal-minded elite and sub-elite Westerners are any longer 
capable of identifying and taking the kinds of initiatives that might deal con-
structively with the world’s problems. They are blind to the fact that in their 
own societies the spread of democratic suffrage in ways that did not fundamen-
tally undermine liberal practices depended on the prior existence of consensu-
ally united elites. This spread also probably depended on substantial world 
economic and military domination by the West. Consequently, they cannot 
comprehend that the absence of these conditions in most non-Western countries 
may necessitate less than democratic means of governing them. 
I have tried to show – in a roundabout way that will have tried the reader’s 
patience – how democratic elitism can be put on a firmer intellectual and com-
parative-historical footing than recent Western political thought has recog-
nized. Writing as a liberal, Joseph Schumpeter correctly saw that democracy is 
a “method,” or in my term an instrumental value, that can serve the ultimate 
liberal goal of a “free people.” Addressing English-speaking readers in the 
early 1940s whom he plausibly assumed to be of liberal persuasion, Schumpe-
ter did not highlight the comparative historical distinctiveness, indeed the rari-
ty, of the democracy he described. Nor, perhaps conscious of his American 
location and its egalitarian proclivities, did he think it useful to highlight the 
elitism implicit in his description of democracy. 
Numerous, mainly American critics of his theory did this soon enough. They 
depicted democratic elitism as an unwanted, even outrageous closure of the 
open-ended road to ideal democracy that they regarded their society and, they 
wanted to believe, all societies are traveling. Critics of democratic elitism have 
hoped to find some less elite-centered and more impersonal and universal form 
of democracy. This is probably a forlorn hope. They must come to terms with 
the more or less ineluctable aspects of politics and elites explored above. If and 
when they do, their conception of democracy will not differ significantly from 
that which Schumpeter offered. 
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